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Unlike industry where a company can bring in senior leaders at any time, USAF senior leaders are a product of more than 20 continuous years of de-liberate career development. Therefore, young officers who are thought to 
have the potential for senior leadership must be identified early in their careers 
and vectored to the right opportunities. How these officers are identified, assessed, 
and developed is not well understood by most of the USAF.
Every officer’s performance is continually assessed and documented to provide a 
means of stratification within squadrons, groups, wings, and so forth. Officer Perfor-
mance Reports (OPR) and Training Reports (TR) track these assessments, the ver-
biage used, and awards achieved, and stratification among peers serve as a “reliable, 
22 | Air & Space Power Journal
Nolan & Overstreet
long-term, cumulative record of performance and promotion potential.” Once an 
officer accumulates the requisite years of service to compete for the rank of major 
and above, a Promotion Recommendation Form (PRF) summarizes the highlights of 
that officer’s career and communicates “performance-based potential.”1
The term potential is an important distinction because the word is not synonymous 
with performance. In fact, high performance is often mistaken for high potential.2 The 
difference between the two does not mean that performance and potential are mutu-
ally exclusive. While most high-potential (HiPo) employees are also high-performing, 
the opposite is not always true. Although it may seem an innocent mistake to confuse 
the two descriptions, Andre Lavoie, the chief executive officer of ClearCompany, 
stated that “not being able to distinguish between performance and potential will 
make it difficult for employers to identify, develop and retain talent.”3 Furthermore, 
Lavoie claims that there is a cost associated with not delineating between the two. 
According to the Korn-Ferry Institute, the cost of misidentifying a HiPo employee is 
three-fold.4 First, misidentification leads to pushing employees into roles that they 
are not qualified for or do not desire, which in the USAF may jeopardize the mission 
and damage an officer’s career. Second, misidentification leads to mediocre perfor-
mance, which may lead to a decrease in organizational morale and an increase in 
employee turnover. Third, misidentification leads to employees losing faith in the 
human resources (HR) department (the Air Force Personnel Center for the USAF), 
which is the perceived owner of the organization’s talent.5
The implications of successfully identifying potential can have positive strategic 
military effects as outlined in the USAF Strategic Master Plan (SMP), Human Capital 
Annex (HCA). The HCA is one of four annexes to the SMP that translates goals and 
objectives required to achieve USAF strategy into initiatives and priorities. Under 
the “Talent Management” section, the HCA states “the detailed, personal manage-
ment of the small subset of Airmen who possess those ever-shifting skills, special 
experiences, and high potential will enable the strategic agility the Air Force of the 
future demands.”6 Although the USAF references the word potential in numerous 
documents, no characteristics or attributes are explicitly stated to aid personnel di-
rectorates in synchronizing their efforts to achieve the strategic guidance outlined 
in the HCA.
Consequently, the problem faced by the USAF is that there is an incomplete un-
derstanding of how to differentiate HiPo company grade officers (CGO). Therefore, 
the purpose of this study is to improve the way the USAF identifies, assesses, and 
develops HiPo officers. To that end, we drew upon multiple data sources, such as 
scholarly journals, magazine articles, talent management case studies, webinars, 
and textbooks to fully immerse the researchers in the case. Once immersed, we 
conducted semistructured interviews to assess the perceived or realized differences 
between an officer’s performance and their future potential. What follows is a brief 
review of the literature, a discussion of our methodology, and our analysis, which 
leads to our seven recommendations for the USAF:
1.  Establish a formal definition of HiPo officers.
2.  Evaluate officers against institutional competencies.
3.  Adopt a simple, executable model to evaluate potential.
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4.  Increase the roles and responsibilities given to CGOs.
5.  Development teams (DT) must have the power to utilize the assignment pro-
cess as a means to deliberately develop officers.
6.  Replace below-the-zone (BPZ)/in-the-promotion zone (IPZ)/above-the-promotion 
zone (APZ) promotions with promotion windows.
7.  Allow DT notes, vectors, and Airman Development Plan (ADP) comments in 
the management-level review (MLR) and Central Selection Board (CSB) process.
Literature Review
The researchers noticed significant, similar descriptions of a HiPo employee. Utilizing 
Nvivo’s Word Cloud tool, we populated the program with various “high-potential” ar-
ticles and reports focusing on specific characteristics describing HiPo employees. 
Scholarly articles were equally weighted, and multiple instances of the same word were 
ignored to avoid skewing the query. As shown in the figure, results highlighted an 
emphasis on an individual’s drive, learning, agility, and leadership, which were also 
coincidental with Dr. Rob Silzer and Dr. Allen A. Church’s findings in their 2010 corpo-
rate survey.7 In the survey, organizations’ top three HiPo identification factors were 
leadership competencies, past performance, and career aspiration. Other factors con-
sidered were adaptability, commitment, experiences, mobility, and learning ability.8
Figure. Common descriptors of high-performing individuals
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While the factors of HiPos are valuable in increasing the prediction probability of 
a person’s future potential, most people inquire: “potential for what?” The question 
is valid and is best explained by viewing potential in three different time frames: 
past-looking, near-term, and long-term. Past-looking definitions are best suited for 
static, nonrapidly changing environments as future roles are similar to past or current 
positions. Only 10 percent of organizations identify HiPos in this manner. Near-
term potential involves looking one to two jobs in the future and matches a person 
with a function. Approximately 25 percent of companies define potential this way 
and categorize potential by level or strategic position.9 Projecting long-term potential 
means identifying ambiguous future roles for HiPos and is associated with potential 
by breadth or by role.10 Depending on the organization, one or all three definitions 
categorize different talent groups.
Silzer and Church discovered organizations cluster HiPo talent into four, “band-
level” designations.11 The purpose of categorizing this way ensures a company 
maintains an appropriate talent level throughout the organization while maximizing 
its strategic competitive advantage. The four levels are: top potential (senior-level 
potential), turn potential (next-level potential), grow potential (the same level but 
expanded), and mastery potential (same work, same level).
Senior executives play a significant role in an organization’s HiPo solicitation and 
nomination process. Typically conducted on an annual basis, the process is top-
down driven. Managers at all levels can nominate candidates based on the organiza-
tional definition and categorization of HiPos. As a nominee’s “package” travels 
through the organizational hierarchy, higher-level managers assess, approve, or re-
move prospective HiPos, providing senior leaders a calibrated list of candidates. Ad-
ditionally, organizations leverage advanced data collection technologies, capturing a 
candidate’s background information, which bolsters a wide array of assessment 
tools.12 Current tools in use are leadership competency surveys, 360-degree inter-
views, practical competency measures, career background interviews, cognitive 
ability tests, personality inventories, assessment centers, or individual assessments. 
Depending on the organization, collected data is either used to make initial HiPo 
decisions or serve as an assessment tool for individuals already accepted as a HiPo 
talent. If an organization uses the data for the latter, it is intended to facilitate an 
individual’s development.
Once identified as a HiPo talent, organizations begin preparing individuals for future 
leadership roles through systematic development. Irrespective of the transparency of 
HiPo designation, senior leaders continuously review and discuss developmental op-
portunities for HiPo employees. Examples of deliberate development include but are 
not limited to formal leadership programs, access to coaches or mentors, in-depth 
executive assessments, career planning, distinctive work assignments (projects, task 
forces, or temporary assignments), or executive education courses.13
Although companies execute an exhaustive process for identifying HiPo talent, 
research shows 5–20 percent of initially labeled HiPos do not succeed during the 
developmental process.14 This failure may be a result of misidentifying HiPo talent 
or a sign of an inefficient developmental process. In either case, the research is 
clear HiPo identification is an inexact science.
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Air Force Pamphlet (AFPAM) 36-2506: You and Your Promotions—The Air Force Officer 
Promotion Program outlines and communicates the timeline, procedures, and criteria 
used for officer promotion. Additionally, the document serves as a baseline for the 
USAF talent management processes and practices that facilitate the service’s ability 
to distinguish the performance and potential of its officers. The seven major distin-
guishing criteria for officer evaluations are job performance, leadership, professional 
qualities, breadth and depth of experience, job responsibility, academic and profes-
sional military education, and specific achievements. The USAF evaluates every offi-
cer’s relative potential and refers to the grading process as the whole-person concept, 
which is now called “Whole Airman Factors.”15
The USAF defines potential as “performance-based” and uses numerous forms to 
create a “cumulative record of performance and promotion potential based on that 
performance.”16 It is then fair to assess that USAF HiPo talent is categorized by re-
cord.17 This type of talent categorization best suits organizations in nonrapidly 
changing environments, or when future roles are similar to the past positions; only 
a minority of organizations identify HiPos in this manner.18 Moreover, categorizing 
talent “by record” is incongruent with the USAF’s current strategic guidance.
In 2015, Gen Mark A. Welsh III, then the USAF Chief of Staff, emphasized two 
strategic imperatives: agility and inclusiveness. He stated, “we must commit to 
changing those things that stand between us and our ability to rapidly adapt.”19 
Moreover, the Air Force's SMP/HCA parlayed this sentiment into its “Talent Manage-
ment” section. One deliverable was for the USAF to “ensure an institutional HR system 
capable of rapidly recognizing and adapting to the changing environment.”20 This 
statement insinuates certain changes must occur for the USAF to identify its “small 
subset of Airmen who possess those ever-shifting skills, special experiences, and 
high potential.”21 Currently, the only conduits for capturing potential are through the 
OPR, PRF, TR, and Letter of Evaluation documents, as well as vetting through DTs, 
MLRs, and CSBs.
One major component embedded in OPRs and PRFs is the extensive use of strati-
fications differentiating officers among each other. Accompanying the stratification 
is the push line, whereby the rater communicates an officer’s potential for future 
leadership roles. However, the rater’s assessment of future potential is restricted 
due to limits on the rater’s competency to judge requirements for service at higher 
levels beyond the rater’s own experience, notwithstanding the limited scope of 
communicating potential, the lack of a numerical figure, introduction of a percentage, 
or numerator greater than one indicates a lesser caliber of an officer. Additionally, 
there is an implied distribution of stratified officers. Nevertheless, it is arduous to 
determine where the numerical tiering occurs. Furthermore, the second and third-
level stratifications are confusing. What is the difference between “one of my best 
officers” and “top 10% in the wing?” It seems to imply that “one of my best officers” 
is less than 10 percent of top officers, but greater than an “outstanding” officer.
The USAF also describes 8 institutional competencies (IC) and 25 subcompeten-
cies.22 ICs are “the foundation for developing professional military education pro-
grams,” and those programs “allow Airmen to understand and possibly demonstrate 
the desired IC proficiencies.”23 Additionally, ICs are intended to “create the appro-
priate strategies, policies, and processes required to prepare all Airmen with the 
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necessary leadership expertise to accomplish assigned airpower missions.”24 Fur-
thermore, the explicitly stated purpose of ICs is to “set behavioral standards of lead-
ership for all levels,” and ICs are “observable, measurable patterns of knowledge, 
skills, abilities, behaviors, and other characteristics needed to perform institutional 
of occupational functions successfully.”25 Observations and measurements are di-
vided into five distinct levels: basic, intermediate, proficient, skilled, and advanced. 
Each measurement corresponds to various pay grades and applies to both enlisted 
and officer personnel, as well as civil servants. In many instances, there is an ex-
pectation for enlisted, officer, and civil servants to demonstrate the same level of 
proficiency. In any case, it stands to reason these competencies are intended for in-
clusion in an officer’s performance evaluation to gauge their developmental prog-
ress as well as assess their future potential.
Methodology
An intrinsic case study design was used to better understand the characteristics 
or attributes of a HiPo CGO and how the USAF can better identify, assess, and de-
velop them. Emerging themes, from senior leader interviews, served as the units of 
analysis for this article. As themes emerged, the researchers coded and tracked the 
data with Nvivo qualitative research software.
We invited 18 USAF senior leaders to participate in the study, and 14 senior leaders 
accepted (77.7-percent response rate). These 14 senior leaders had an average of 28 
years of service and had DT, MLR, or CSB experience, as well as multiple command 
tours. In total, ten general officers and four colonels with flying, maintenance, spe-
cial operations, or cyber experience were interviewed to gain their perspectives on 
HiPo officers.
We conducted semistructured interviews in person, over the phone, and via 
email. The medium used was entirely dependent on the participant, their location, 
and their schedule. The semistructured format is well suited for situations where a 
researcher may only get one opportunity to interview an individual.26 Furthermore, 
Dr. H. Russell Bernard, an anthropology professor at the University of Florida, states 
“semi-structured interviewing works very well in projects where you are dealing with 
high-level bureaucrats and elite members of a community—people who are accus-
tomed to the efficient use of their time.”27 We requested each participant’s permission 
to record the interview, and all agreed.
At the conclusion of each interview, we created a denaturalized transcript of the au-
dio file, reviewed notes, and wrote an interview summary to capture themes or key-
words and phrases. Denaturalized transcription captures a verbatim depiction of 
speech, but is not concerned with every utterance.28 Naturalized transcription, by com-
parison, analyzes the idiosyncrasies of speech patterns, body movements, and other 
nonverbal activity which sociologists Dr. Ian Hutchby and Dr. Robin Wooffitt refer to 
as talk-in-interaction.29 Therefore, denaturalized transcription was deemed sufficient 
in capturing the substance, essence, and meaning of the participant’s thoughts.
Qualitative data analysis is an ongoing, continuous endeavor conducted through-
out the research process.30 Unlike quantitative research, the researcher collects and 
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analyzes data simultaneously. The iterative process aids the researcher in organizing 
their findings for the final report. We used Dr. John W. Creswell’s data analysis spiral 
as a guide to flow through interview data.31 The data analysis spiral contains the fol-
lowing steps: organize, peruse, classify, and synthesize.
To classify the data, we used codes (that is, tags or labels) for assigning units of 
meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study. 
Codes are usually “attached to chunks of varying size—words, phrases, sentences or 
whole paragraphs.”32 Codes help answer several questions such as what is happening, 
what does this say, and what is the participant conveying? We started with four major 
coding categories: high-performance officer indicators, HiPo officer indicators, per-
sonnel management system processes, and process improvement ideas. These 
codes were directly related to the central and investigative questions. As the study 
progressed, we used Nvivo’s qualitative research software to track and manage 
codes. Finally, we implemented Tesch’s eight-step coding process to discover 
emerging themes systematically.33
As recommended by Creswell, to ensure reliability and validity of our study we 
implemented two strategies: triangulation and member checking.34 Triangulation 
involves analyzing different data sources to justify themes. During the data analysis 
phase, we cross-referenced with private industry HiPo employee studies. The purpose 
of comparing the two was to uncover similar themes in industry. The intent was to 
link ideas, discover implemented enterprise solutions and how they may relate to the 
research study. Member checking is a process where the researcher solicits partici-
pants’ feedback on the interpretations and credibility of the findings. At the conclusion 
of the study, we conducted follow-up interviews, discussed major themes, and pro-
vided an opportunity for participants to analyze the findings critically. The participant 
comments served as another check on the viability of the researcher’s interpretations.35
Data Analysis
The primary research data comprised of senior leader interviews with an exhaustive 
literature review serving as the secondary data source. In total, the researcher refer-
enced or cited 175 scholarly articles, textbooks, and talent management case studies. 
The literature review enabled the researcher to orient, compare, and help analyze 
interview data. The 14 interviews totaled more than 12 hours of audio, which equated 
to 193 pages of transcripts. The medium used for interviews varied with the prepon-
derance conducted via telephone. In all cases, the conversations were recorded using 
Apple’s Voice Memo application or the TapeACall application. Once completed, all 
audio files were transcribed using denaturalized techniques and Wreally Transcribe 
software. The researcher concluded the interview process when “data saturation” 
was achieved.
After all the interviews, the researchers generated 15 codes. Utilizing Nvivo’s 
word frequency query, word cloud, and word tree function, we identified four broad 
categories and nine subcategories. The four categories were HiPo Indicators, High-
Performance Indicators, Perceived Issues, and Recommendations. The eight subcat-
egories were organizational perspectives, categories of potential, HiPo nomination, 
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HiPo assessment, HiPo development, board issues, system problems, and process 
problems. As with other HiPo talent case studies, there was an overlap in how par-
ticipants defined an officer’s performance versus their potential. The major task 
was parsing the difference between the two definitions. Our analysis uncovered the 
top three HiPo indicators, the USAF’s perspective of HiPo officers, and how the par-
ticipants nominate, assess, and develop HiPo officers.
The top three indicators of HiPo talent, as described by interview participants, 
were sustained performance, continuous learning, and demonstrative leadership 
skills. Sustained performance was identified as a major indicator of an officer’s fu-
ture performance as the promotion system is designed to reward such behaviors. A 
sustained performance methodology is best suited for static, nonrapidly changing 
environments as future roles are similar to the past or current positions.36 Further-
more, one senior leader identified this as a problem. While “officers can perform 
well at one level, that does not indicate they will be successful in future roles.”
Continuous learning was another HiPo identifier mentioned by participants. In 
some instances, participants stated HiPo officers were “life-long learners” while 
others described them as “inquisitive, reflective, or continuously seeking feedback.” 
The commonality among all the responses was that HiPo officers are not satisfied 
with their current state. They are always trying to better themselves and others. 
The focus beyond individual needs and desires embodies the third HiPo indicator 
which is leadership. All participants mentioned highly-developed leadership skills 
as a HiPo officer indicator. When combined, these HiPo officer indicators closely 
resemble industry standards. By comparison, the top indications of HiPo talent in 
the private sector are drive, learning, agility, and leadership. This discovery indi-
cates that industry best practices may provide pragmatic solutions in the USAF’s 
HiPo officer identification process.
The majority of participants stated stratifications were a means of communicating 
an officer’s potential. Stratifications reside on the fifth and ninth line of an OPR, as 
well as the bottom line of a PRF. Just as various psychological, communication, and 
advertising studies indicate last impressions dramatically influence evaluations, so, 
too, is the placement of stratifications on these official documents.37 In most in-
stances, participants stated stratifications served as both a current performance and 
future potential for performance indicator. However, a few participants reported 
they believed stratifications to be an indicator of only current performance. In any 
case, when asked how they evaluated records while working on a DT, MLR, or CSB, 
stratifications were mentioned as a way of differentiating the promotion potential, 
in all instances. Several of the participants explicitly tempered stratifications with 
the officers “full body of work.”
As commanders, the participants stated their intention of pushing HiPo officers 
to different jobs or assignments as a means of communicating their potential. In 
some instances, the other jobs were in the form of challenging projects which re-
ceived “higher visibility” from senior leaders. A few of the participants stated the 
purpose of these actions was to highlight the officer’s potential based on their 
knowledge of how the system works. While pushing officers into closer proximity of 
senior leaders is a way of communicating an officer’s potential, the also act serves 
as a means of assessment. Just as stated in the HiPo assessment process, senior 
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leaders use “stretch” assignments to challenge officers outside of their core compe-
tency. The purpose of a “stretch” assignment is to take HiPo employees out of their 
normal day-to-day activities and make them accountable for something more strate-
gic in nature.38
Beyond stretch assignments, the majority of participants stated coaching, men-
toring, and senior leader feedback was a means to develop HiPo officers. Although 
some may argue coaching, mentoring, and feedback should not be reserved solely 
for a select group of individuals, multiple studies and articles recommend deliberately 
investing more resources towards these efforts.39 The key term, both from previous 
studies and participants, was the perceived and realized value of deliberately con-
ducting all three activities commensurate with an officer’s or employee’s talent level.
Most participants stated the boarding process was extremely efficient given the 
volume of records requiring review. However, 10 of the 14 participants identified 
several issues with the system or process. One senior leader claimed the most diffi-
cult portion of a board was the amount of “homework required, before arrival.” In 
this instance, the participant was discussing a DT and believed that some of the work 
accomplished on-site should be achieved beforehand. Additionally, several partici-
pants mentioned the difference in scoring outcomes when contrasting a DT to a CSB. 
Although the “population size and makeup the officer is competing with is different, 
there are times where the scores between the groups are significantly different.”
It is important to note that the DT, MLR, and CSB boards do not share scores or 
information among each other. The only way for DTs to notice a scoring discrepancy 
is by analyzing promotion results and comparing them to their vector. As an exam-
ple, if a DT issues an officer a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) vector, they are signaling 
two things. First, the officer is among the top tier of their community and, second, 
the officer should be considered for a JCS job opportunity. However, if the CSB does 
not promote or the officer is not selected for an intermediate developmental educa-
tion (IDE) opportunity, the DT knows there is a delta between their score and the 
CSB. This problem may be identified in the reverse order as well. Assume an officer 
was promoted and was a school select the previous year. The proceeding DT knows 
this individual did not receive a strong vector and when scoring the records, deter-
mined the officer was outside of the top 20 percent of their functional area. In both 
instances, the DT must reconcile the difference.
There is a tendency to promote familiarity and preference over objective criteria 
of the service’s needs for the future. To be clear, we are not suggesting board mem-
bers ignore Secretary of the Air Force or commander guidance deliberately when 
scoring records. We posit that there is a possibility that board members bring their 
values into the process which is in line with interview responses and Leader-Member 
Exchange (LMX) theory. LMX theory describes the give-and-take relationship be-
tween leaders and their subordinates.40 In-group members share common value sys-
tems while out-group members have little in common with the leader. Research also 
reveals work units are differentiated through LMX relationships approximately 90 
percent of the time. Therefore, the researcher’s finding is not uncommon, should be 
expected, and was reaffirmed in another participant’s similar sentiment.
Another senior leader believed “a person’s real strength and leadership are not 
found in a paper record, which is clearly where the rubber meets the road.” As the 
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paper record contains numerous accomplishments during an officer’s career, the 
current system views the accumulation of accomplishments as an analogous metric 
for talent. Several referred to certain accomplishments as “career milestones.” Half 
of the participants explicitly identified Squadron Officer School (SOS) Distinguished 
Graduate (DG) as one of these milestones while the other half referenced all awards 
received from training or development programs as such. While the preponderance 
of the participants agreed that DG awards were indicative of demonstrating “excel-
lent performance, relative to their peers,” 5 of the 14 participants claimed SOS DG 
was disproportionately weighted.
Although formal training awards constitute one significant discriminator in an 
officer’s records, stratifications on OPRs and PRFs were another issue raised by par-
ticipants. One cannot overemphasize the value and importance of stratifications. 
From a commander’s perspective, an officer stratification indicates potential. However, 
one participant rhetorically asked, “Do you think stratifications mean the same 
thing to all commanders?” The participant went on to say “determining how thinly 
we slice the stratification is an important distinction.” The “thinness” of a stratification 
describes the specificity of a relevant peer group (for example, “number 1 of 10 2008 
instructor-pilot captains” versus “number 1 of 10 captains”). This last statement al-
ludes to the lack of codified or universal way of crafting an officer stratification, 
which may lead to issues in the boarding process.
Recommendations
The results of this study offer insight into how the USAF delineates an officer’s 
current performance from their future potential. Additionally, the findings illumi-
nate the scope and depth the USAF defines talent at the strategic, operational, and 
individual level. Based on the literature review and interview data, we provide 
seven recommendations to improve how the USAF identifies, assesses, and devel-
ops HiPo officers.
1. Establish a formal definition of high-potential officers.
This definition must capture the “ever-shifting skills, special experiences, and 
high potential, which enable the strategic agility the Air Force of the future de-
mands.”41 AFI 36-2406 states potential is “performance-based” and uses numerous 
forms to create a “cumulative record of performance and promotion potential based 
on that performance.”42 Air Force Reserve Command Instruction 36-2640 uses the 
acronym “HP” to mean “high-potential” and says an individual has met a command 
screening board or on the key personnel list.43 Headquarters Air Force Air Staff 
guidance outlines indicators of potential as being a DG from a commissioning 
source, formal training program, PME, IDE, SDE, high-level OPR stratification, BPZ 
selection, and other objective criteria. However, all of these areas may not be valid 
indicators of potential. In fact, research and private industry agree that drive, ability 
to learn, leadership, and other leadership competencies and skills, are the top signs 
of HiPo employees. The researcher found the senior leaders interviewed agreed 
with this conclusion. Consequently, questions left outstanding are what skills 
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should the USAF measure and how should they measure them? These questions 
lead to our second recommendation.
2. Evaluate officers against institutional competencies in AFMAN 36-2647.
The purpose of institutional competencies is to “set behavioral standards of leader-
ship for all levels,” and to do that they must be “observable, measurable patterns of 
knowledge, skills, abilities, behaviors, and other characteristics needed to perform in-
stitutional and occupational functions successfully.”44 Therefore, these criteria re-
quire inculcation into every officer’s records. Some may argue this recommendation 
is too cumbersome and difficult to manage given the current documentation used to 
evaluate officers—which may be true. However, assuming institutional competencies 
properly align with the HCA, it is crucial that the USAF act on this recommendation.
3. Adopt a simple, executable model to evaluate the potential of all 
company grade officers.
Organizations considered to have “best practices” in the field of talent management, 
use models to identify and assess their employees’ potential. Models are available 
to gauge an employee’s future potential. They measure the probability an individual 
can successfully take on greater roles and responsibilities, in both breadth and 
depth, as leaders in their organization. These models are an excellent template to 
use for deliberately and methodically identifying and assessing HiPo CGOs.
4. Increase the roles and responsibilities given to company grade officers.
If the purpose of a HiPo officer program is to identify future leaders, then the as-
sessment process must include leadership challenges that truly test the capability 
of an officer. These “tests” must be monitored and tracked beyond a stratification or 
push line. The literature does not include any instances where companies distilled 
the performance of an individual, or their potential to perform in the future, into 
one singular number relative to their peers. In fact, the best talent management 
companies use multiple sources to identify and assess HiPo employees. These 
sources include an objective assessment of budget management, project impact on 
business performance, as well as peer, subordinate, and supervisor feedback. The 
USAF must achieve this level of fidelity of an officer’s capability to accurately assess 
their potential for future leadership roles. The information captured must then be 
monitored and maintained by a central talent management entity. Currently, force 
development offices are best aligned to serve this function while DTs are best suited 
to carry out the annual assessment and development of the HiPo talent pool. Unfor-
tunately, DTs lack the authority to be as effective as intended, which leads to the 
fifth recommendation.
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5. Developmental teams must have the power to utilize the assignment 
process as a means to deliberately develop officers.
Although DTs must identify “the education, training, and experiences appropriate 
for officers,” the only outputs they provide are assignment vectors and career feed-
back.45 The Air Force Personnel Center is the only organization with authority to 
generate assignments. DTs must be able to pair their developmental strategies with 
officer assignments. Moreover, the movement of personnel in industry does not 
happen serendipitously—especially for someone singled out as a HiPo. The assign-
ment and development of a HiPo is a very deliberate process. Employees move to 
locations where the job experience is intended to prepare them for future roles in 
the organization. Furthermore, the USAF should consider deliberately placing CGOs 
with mentors that can facilitate further professional development.
6. Replace BPZ/IPZ/APZ promotions with promotion windows.
Presently, BPZ boards do not follow a similar construct as IPZ and APZ boards. 
The “Definitely Promote” (DP) allocation rate is 10 percent for BPZ promotions to 
lieutenant colonel and 15 percent to colonel. Comparatively, IPZ and APZ “DP” 
rates are 40 and 20 percent, respectively.46 These DP allotment caps are intended to 
ensure only “the most qualified records are endorsed” and provide a greater chance 
that “a significant number of officers receiving “Promote” recommendations” are 
promoted as well.47 Although the USAF can promote to their allotted “DP” rate, they 
seldom do so.48 Furthermore, the BPZ records scoring is dissimilar to the IPZ and 
APZ process. First, BPZ scoring starts with an up/down, yes or no vote, which de-
termines which records are considered “Exceptionally Well Qualified.”49 Then, the 
board scores only those records.
While there are processes in place to calibrate BPZ selects with IPZ selects, a few 
senior leaders mentioned, with one directly stating, the process was “purely a 
square-filling exercise.” The participant went on to say BPZ boards “look for the 
markers that stand out (that is, PME DG, what school an individual attended, and 
the amount of number one stratifications received). These boards look at past career 
milestones or achievements as analogs for promotion criteria, whereas the IPZ board 
at least attempts to determine an individual’s ability to serve in the next grade.” The 
leader who was interviewed understood the quota system, but he did not understand 
why the process was different. Likewise, we postulate that HiPo talent or promotion 
potential is indifferent to year groups.
As such, the researcher proposes an alternative to the current promotion con-
struct by creating promotion windows which look similar to the BPZ timeline but 
alters the quota system and mentality. The main difference between the two methods 
is that anyone who is eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel or colonel would 
see the same board and be vetted the same exact way. This modification allows for 
equitability and transparency in the process.
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7. Allow developmental team notes, vectors, and Airman Developmental Plan 
comments in management-level review and Central Selection Board process.
DTs have much more flexibility and latitude when reviewing officer records. Ac-
cording to the senior leaders interviewed, the amount of time spent on each record 
varies from board to board. However, DTs typically spend eight minutes on a record, 
while MLRs and CSBs spend two minutes or less per record. Additionally, DTs are 
allowed to discuss individuals openly and are not bound to the rigid scoring process 
the MLR and CSB must follow. The reason for this difference is attributable to their 
respective outputs. An MLR board allocates additional DP recommendations, which 
provides a demonstrable positive effect on promotion rates, while the CSB promotes 
individuals. By comparison, DTs offer assignment vectors and feedback, with no 
formal authority. Still, DTs view the same records, develop a similar rank-ordered 
officer list, but have the luxury of reviewing an officer’s ADP as well. When com-
bined with the functional experience of their career field, the rich data source pro-
vides a more robust means to assess the potential of an officer. Why would we not 
use this information when determining who to promote?
Some may argue this would provide an undue influence on subsequent boards. 
Our counterpoint is how does the DT support for promotion differ from an MLR DP 
recommendation? In the end, it is just information, and each board must indepen-
dently evaluate the future potential of an officer to serve in greater roles and re-
sponsibilities. Nevertheless, DTs are best situated to know and understand the officers 
they evaluate. Therefore, we recommend the results of DTs be packaged and in-
cluded for MLRs and CSBs to consider. A few ideas offered for consideration are 
providing: percentiles of officer’s standing within their respective community, out-
placement vectors, DT notes on individuals, or a DT rank-ordered officer list, which 
is intended to serve as a comparative analysis tool after a board convenes.
Summary
The USAF faces several challenges in the coming years—whether it is the reten-
tion of personnel or fiscal constraints. The current operating environment dictates 
a fresh look at the various ways the USAF conducts business. Therefore, it is imper-
ative that the USAF effectively identify, assess, and develop its top talent to succeed 
in future military conflicts. While it seems this article’s focus is strictly on top-tier 
talent, the criteria used to assess applies to all Airmen. Currently, the USAF’s defini-
tion of talent is not clear. Its personnel system requires simplicity and transparency. 
By capitalizing on the outlined recommendations, the USAF can leverage its greatest 
asset—its people. 
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